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An overworked court I has continued to render opinions at the rate of
nearly two daily during the period covered by this report. 2 More apparent
than ever before should be the need of devising a method of screening appeals
before the cases reach the Supreme Court. While in a growing jurisprudence,
cases are decided on points which have been settled long ago in states whose
system is more mature, our study leads us to the conclusion that a large per-
centage of cases involve points, mostly of procedure, which have been well
settled in this state. With a customary apology for the use of titles to show
the arrangement of material, we proceed to examine the cases.
PUBLIC LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Special and local laws. During the preceding
quarter; a decision was noted :3 holding that a general law regulating the
practice of courts of justice, is unconstitutional unless it is of uniform opera-
tion in the several counties of the state. The opinion admitted of no classifica-
tion by counties according to population, even in cases where there might be
a reasonable need to deal with a problem differently in large and small
counties. In a current decision, 4 however, it is intimated that classification of
counties by size for governmental purposes is permissible if there is a reason-
able and just relation between the subject matter affected and the size. Where
classification is purely arbitrary, a general statute may nevertheless be treated
as a local or special law. This was an action to enjoin sale of liquor at a
restaurant located within 2500 feet of an established church or school.5 A
license had been granted pursuant to a recent statute " making an exception
to the general rule in the case of restaurants capable of accommodating at
least 500 persons located within three miles of the boundaries of a city of
more than 100,000 persons in all counties of not less than 150,000 nor more
than 250,000. according to the last preceding state census. While of potential
operation throughout the state, the act affected only one establishment, the
"Crystal Ball." located within three miles of the city of Tampa in Hills-
1. For the same conclusions, more modestly stated by a member of the court, see
Elwyn Thomas, Justice Without Delay, 2 U. OF FLA. L. R. 1 (1949).
2. The cases reported are found in 38 So.2d, pp. 30-440, covering the months of
December, 1948, and January, 1949, in part. The quarter has been somewhat arbitrarily
shortened.
3. State ex retL York v. Beckham, 36 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1948), noted supra, p. 284.
4. Carter v. Norman, 38 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1948).
5. See Fleeman1 v. Vocelle, 37 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1948), noted supra, p. 286.
'6. F. S. 1941, § 561.44(2), as amended by c. 23835, LAws oF FLA., 1947.
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borough County. Because of the peculiar peninsular situation of Tampa,
the area was more restricted than might otherwise appear. To state the facts
is to show that this was arbitrary classification. However, as Mr. Batchelor
has pointed out.7 statutes bracketing counties are more apt to be considered
arbitrary than those which distinguish between large and small units. Juxtaposi-
tion of the present and preceding cases leads to the conclusion that there is a
distinction between local and special laws affecting the practice of courts, and,
inferentially, the other subjects enumerated in Section 20, which are wholly
prohibited, and other special and local laws, which are qualifiedly permitted in
Section 21.8 It may also be indicated that there is a difference between a
statute which grants special privileges '" and one that is an exercise of the
"lpolice power"; since it is frequently said, in construing the equal protection
clause of the Federal Constitution, that the legislature may confine its regula-
tion to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest.10 The
recent case leaves no less doubtful the constitutionality of more than 1500
population" statutes.'
Public property. During previous quarters, cases have been noted 12 in
which statutes authorizing the transfer of public property to other govern-
mental agencies, state and federal, were approved. The latest of these held
that. if the property were regarded as held in trust for the public, breach of
trust could not be prevented under the due process clauses. The opposite view
seems to be taken in a current decision. t : Property which was dedicated to a
city for use as a public park, was offered by the city to the federal government
7. Batchelor. Population Statutes under the Florida Constitution, 1 MIAI L. '0. 97
(1947). and (without footnotes) in 21 FLA. B. J. 48 (1947). The proposed constitution,
submitted tentatively by the Florida State Bar Association's committee, D. H. Redfearn,
chairman, provides: "Every local law shall be enacted as such and not as a general law
with local application. Every law relating to a single county or municipality or other
political subdivision shall be enacted as a local law and shall not become effective until
approved by a majority of the qualified electors of the political unit affected voting on
such law." Art. III, § 25jb).
8. FLA. CoN sT., ART. III.
9. But cf. Hialeah Race Course v. Gulfstream Park, 37 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1948), holding
that a lucrative monopoly may be granted to operate a business (race track) which
might otherwise be prohibited because of inherent danger to the public. Discussed, supra,
p. 280.
10. See Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292 (1924).
11. For count, see Batchelor, op. cit., note 7, supra.
12. Watson v. Caldwell, 35 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1948), noted in Quarterly Synopsis,
2 MIAIi L. Q. 318 (1948) (involving gifts of state lands to federal government for the
Everglades National Park) ; Cleary v. Dade County, 37 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1948), discussed
in Quarterly Synopsis, p. 282, supra (sustaining transfer of Jackson Memorial Hospital
from Miami to Dade County).
13. Kramer v. Lakeland, 38 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1948). Munn dedicated certain lots in
his original plan of Lakeland for use as a public park. Later the city conveyed the lots
to a bank, Munn's successor joining in the deed. This conveyance was set aside in 1924 in
injunction proceedings. In 1928, Munn's successor conveyed the fee to the city. In 1940,
the city leased the park to a civic group, and injunction proceedings followed, a decree
being entered on stipulation that the city could offer the property to the federal government.
Held, that the stipulation was beyond the municipal attorney's power, and that the
property could not be conveyed to the federal government without legislative authorization.
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by way of gift. No statutory authorization broad enough to cover such a
transaction was found, but the court recognized the power of the legislature
to authorize such a conveyance. In the previous case, legislative authorization
was found in the municipal charter. If the reason is that the municipality holds
the property as a trustee and not in a proprietary capacity, it should apply in
either case as a limitation on the power of the legislature. It has been noted that
in the cases where the gift was authorized, the transferee received the
property upon a public trust, although not necessarily the same trust. These
cases may well illustrate the survival of prerogative cy pres in this country.'
4
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Legislative control. The plenary power of
the legislature to create, enlarge, contract or abolish municipal corporations is
subject to two constitutional limitations: the first, that to include property
which will not be benefited is to take property without due process of law,' 5
and the second, that the legislature cannot provide for the abolition of a
municipality without providing for the protection of creditors.' 0 The first
branch of the rule is illustrated in a quo warranto proceeding "7 wherein lands
located on keys were held to have been illegally included within the limits of a
city some distance removed by land and water and not actually or potentially
benefited thereby. Application of the second limitation was avoided due to the
fact that no creditors were joined in, and therefore not bound by, the pro-
ceeding. Disannexation in the case of smaller communities is specifically
permitted by statute; but the test applied by the court is substantially the
same.' 5 Rural land which is not benefited immediately may be included so as
to provide for its development; but where prospective benefits are not appar-
ent, exclusion should be ordered.
Municipal bonds. Limitations found in the state constitution prohibit
issuance of bonds by municipalities unless the issue has been approved by vote
of the freeholders who are qualified electors.' 9 With one express exception in
the case of refunding bonds, this prohibition is absolute in its terms, as noted
by Mr. Justice Adams, dissenting, in a recent case.2 0 The Supreme Court. how-
ever, has construed this limitation to be subject to one further exception, that
when the credit of the municipality is not pledged, self-liquidating bonds may
be authorized without vote of the freeholders. Further developing the excep-
14. The British crown might by sign manual expropriate property conveyed upon a
public trust from a disfavored to an approved purpose. Thus, where property was left in
trust to maintain a synagogue, the crown ordered it held to support a preacher of the
established church in a foundling hospital. DaCosta v. DePas. 1 Amb. 228 (1754) : see
REDFFARN., WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION1 OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA 354 (2d ed., 1946).
15. FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights, § 12; see State ex rel. Davis v. Stuart, 97
Fla. 69, 120 So, 335, 64 A. L. R. 1307 (1929), holding that it is taking without compensa-
tion.
16. FLA. CoNsT., Art. VIII, § 8.
17. Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Watson. 38 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1948).
18. Smith v. Montverde. 38 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1948).
19. FLA. CONST.. Art. IX, § 6.
20. Schmeller v. Fort Lauderdale, 38 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1948).
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tion, and also skirting a limitation on the power of the state to issue bonls,2'
it was recently held that fees received by a county for performing public, or
state, functions could be pledged. 22 Now comes a decision 3 holding that the
proceeds of a municipal utilities tax may be pledged, which further enlarges
the exception. 2 4 With proposals for a new state constitution under considera-
tion, it m1ust be borne in mind that this exception will apply to the new constitu-
tion if not expressly affirmed or denied.25
Municipml officers. The question, whether or not municipal officers who
resign may participate in the selection of their successors, was raised by
proceedings in mandamus, quo warranto, declaratory judgment, and injunc-
tion, consolidated for hearing. 26 The court treated the matter as a subject
which might competently he regulated by the legislature in the municipal
charter or otherwise; but in the absence of specific regulation ruled that a
resigning officer does not have this power. Power to appoint to fill an office
usually depends upon a vacancy, and there is no vacancy until after the
resignation becomes effective.
ADMIN ISTRATIV LAW. Mandamus to reveiew administrative decisions.
Use of the writ of mandamus to prohibit administrative action, rather than a
bill for an injunction, is shown in a recent case.2 7 The Supreme Court, in an
original proceeding, directed the State Racing Commission to rescind an order
which it found to conflict with statutory authority. It is usually held that
mandamus may be used to direct legislative action when it is wrongfully
withheld; but it cannot be used to direct a particular exercise of legislative
power without putting the court across the line of the separation of powers.
When the court directs an administrative agency to withdraw a particular
regulation, it is not only comnimanding action but directing a particular result.
21. FLA. CONST., Art. IX, § 6 (first sentence), § 10.
22. State v. Pinellas County, 36 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1948), discussed in Synopsis, 2
MA AM L. Q. 311 (1948).
23. Schmeller v. Fort Lauderdale. 38 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1948). The city, pursuant to
statutory authority, issued bonds to pay for a recreational center and a yacht basin,
pledging the revenue derived from this operation and the proceeds of a tax on utilities
service. Held, on intervenor's motion in validation proceedings, that the bonds could
lawfully be issued without a vote of the freeholders.
24. An intermediate step was taken in State v. Daytona Beach. 34 So.2d 309 (Fla.
1948), where sewer bonds to be liquidated by a tax on water consumed, were approved.
While in form a utilities service tax. this was actually a service charge fot use of the
sewer, the amount of water consumed oil the premises being a fairly reliable measure of
use.
25. The State Bar Association's Committee on a Proposed Florida Constitution
proposes to retain the present provision, striking the word "freeholders" and substituting
"ad valorem taxpayers." See PROPoSED Ft.. CONSr. Art. IX. § 4 (1948) ; 23 FLA, I.AW J.
94 (1949). Further study may be indicated as a result of this decision.
26. Williams v. Baker. 38 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1948). Two of the five city commissioners
of West Palm Beach, resigning, asserted this power.
27. St. Petersburg Kennel Club v. Baldwin. 38 So.2d 436 (Fla, 1949). Under a
statute providing that where only one licensed dog track is located in a county, such
track may operate 90 days during the racing season, a regulation prohibiting matinee
races on days when horse race meetings were taking place in the vicinity, was in excess
of the delegated power of the State Racing Commission.
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Where courts rectify administrative action already taken by mandamus, it is
usually in connection with a provision in the controlling statute requiring a
refund or an adjustnient.2 1 Doubtless the court would have power to accom-
plish the same result 1y enjoining the enforcement of the regulation.
landamus to review judicial acts. The writ of mandamus being peculiarly
adapted to commanding administrative action wrongfully withheld, but not
to review the exercise of quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions, the
court found mandanuis to the circuit court to be a writ unsuited to review
judicial action.
25
CRIMINAL LAW. Embesdlement. To prove the crime of embezzlement.
it is necessary to show a fiduciary relationship letween the person wrongfully
misappropriating property and its rightful owner. The embezzler may have
title to the property or a mere right of possession, different statutes making
different requirements. Where payments have been made in advance to a
building contractor, who absconds without performing, tile essential fiduciary
relationship does not exist," and it may also be said that if the contractor's
intent was honorable at the time the payment was received, this cannot con-
stitute obtaining money under false pretenses.
Larceny: Criminal intent. A'tortious taking of property is not larceny
without the existence of a criminal intent. When one takes hogs in the honest,
however mistaken, belief that he is recapturing his own property. he has not
committed a criminal offense. :"1
PRIVATE LAW
CONTRACTS. Eltrcisinj nonperfarina rice, \WVhen in a bilateral contract it
is contemplated that performance by both parties will take place simultaneously,
neither party may recover from the other without showing readiness and
ability to perform; but performance or tender may be excused if the other
party repudiates the contract. The ordinary contract to convey land upon
the payment or securing of the purchase price is such a contract. A recent
case 32 involving these points presents some difficulties. The plaintiff, having
an option to purchase land, contracted to sell it to the defendant. When the
parties met to close, the defendant in bad faith refused to performi his part of
the contract. The plaintiff (lid not exercise his option and the defendant
purchased the same land directly from the owner. In an action for breach of
28. See State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line v. Gay, 35 So.2d 403 (Fla. 1948), discussed
in Quarterly SyPIopsis, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 313 (1948): State ex rel. Allen v. Rose, 123 Fla.
544, 167 So. 21 (1936), discussed in Comment, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 235 (1948).
29. Harrell v. Black, 38 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1949).
30. Berney v. State, 38 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1948).
31. Maddox v. State, 38 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1948). The evidence showed taking under
open dispute as to title. The court charged correctly; but the jury returned a verdict of
guilty recommending suspension of sentence. Reversed and remanded.
32. Adams v. Drawdy, 38 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1948).
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contract, the court ruled that since the evidence showed that defendant acted
in bad faith, he could not set up plaintiff's lack of title in defense. It would
seem that the defendant's good or bad faith is immaterial. Either as a matter
of law he was entitled to repudiate the contract because the vendor was not
able to perform, or, as a matter of law, he repudiated before the time for
performance had expired. Interpretation of the contract is ordinarily for
the court, although the terms may be a matter of evidence. Doubtless the
court found that the purchaser repudiated arbitrarily, refusing to allow the
seller a reasonable time in which to perform, as provided actually or inipliedly
in the contract, and this is what the court described as a finding of bad faith;
but to describe the finding as one of fact and not of law is incorrect.
Damages. The same case shows that where a person contracts to sell
land which he does not own, the measure of damages on failure of the
purchaser is the contract price less the cost of acquiring the land. If the
purchaser himself acquires the same property at a lower figure than vendor's
option price, that should not increase the amnount of damages, because it is
plaintiff's loss, not defendant's gain. that is the measure used, unless there is a
fiduciary relationship. The facts reported tend to indicate that this distinction
was not made.
Brokers' commissions-right to retain hand money. During the preceding
quarter, a case was noted 33 in which the Supreme Court stated that a broker's
commission for selling real property is not an element of damages recoverable
for breach of contract to purchase land. This language caused great alarm to
the profession and to real estate brokers, and the court amended its opinion,
as it now appears in the bound volume,3 4 to hold simply that brokers' com-
missions, being readily ascertainable, are not properly the subject of a contract
to pay liquidated damages. The case arose in a pecuIliar way. The parties
entered into a written contract to convey land, the buyer giving and the
seller acknowledging receipt of, a check for hand money. The buyer stopped
payment on the check. The seller sued to recover the face amount of the check,
asserting that this was a contract to pay liquidated damages.
The Supreme Court, affirming a judgment of dismissal, held that a
contract to pay liquidated damages will not be enforced unless damages would
otherwise be difficult to ascertain and the stipulated amount is a fair approxi-
mation to reality. Damages for refusal to purchase under contract are easily
ascertainable, in the opinion of the court, and therefore not the proper subject
33, Pembroke v. Caudill, 37 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1948), noted in Synopsis, pp. 290, 293,
294, supra.
34. The following changes were made in the bound volume: (1) the last paragraph
beginning on page 541 has been substituted, with the exception of the last sentence; (2) a
new paragraph has been added at the end of the opinion: and (3) headnotes (West's)
9 and 10 have been replaced by a new headnote 9. We would not have known of the change
if several readers had not called it to our attention, there being no reference to that
effect in the advance sheets.
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of such an agreement. The court refused to say what disposition should be
made of the hand money where actually deposited. If this is not a valid
contract for liquidated damages, the buyer has an equity of redemption; but
the seller has a lien on the fund for his actual damages, which now definitely
include the broker's conmnission?:'
Specific performance. In an action for specific performance of a contract
to sell real property, the purchaser may be entitled, if not placed in possession
at the stipulated time, to interest on money deposited; or he may, on the
theory that title has passed in equity, require an accounting for rent, issues
and profits)"
CONIrIONAL SAI.ES. Equity of redemption. Where personal property
has been sold under a conditional sales contract, the effect of which is to
retain title in the vendor until the purchase price has been paid, the adjust-
ment of rights between the parties when the vendor has repossessed, presents
problems. If the payments by the purchaser have been substantial, repossession
may result in a forfeiture, against which equity grants relief in the case of
mortgages of real and personal property. The Uniform Conditional Sales
Act :" would obviate the difficulty by requiring the seller to offer the goods
at public sale for the buyer's account if more than fifty per cent has been
1)aid: but the point does not appear to have been developed in the common law
of this state. A recent case IX involved repossession and resale under a contract
which provided that in the event of resale, the purchaser should pay any
deficiency and receive any surplus. It was held that an action would lie on the
common courts for money had and received and on a special count stating
the express contract. The expenses of sale, cost of repossession, and other
charges are by inference matters to be set up in the answer. The court was
unable, because the case was presented on demurrer rather than on motion to
strike, to determine whether insurance preminms paid by the purchaser were
unearned because the sale was terminated forty or fifty days after its inception.
In the absence of an agreement to refund premiums, this would seem to state
no cause of action, particularly if the seller is a mere agent of the insurer.
INSURANCE. An insurance contract is a tunilateral contract, under which,
in consideration of the premium paid, the insurer undertakes for a term to
underwrite specific risks. Where, in consideration of annual premiums an
insurance policy is made to continue in effect from year to year, it is said that
this is an offer to enter into a series of unilateral contracts, The insured is
not bound to renew, but the insurer may not be able to withdraw his offer if
35. The court stated that there is some authority for the proposition that a seller may
retain hand money deposited with him, or with his agent, as liquidated damages. See
McCoRMICK, DAMAGvs, 619 (1935).
36. Bradford v. Harris, 38 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1949). Reversed for refusal to allow
interest to vendee as recommended by master.
37. § 19. See 47 AM. JuR. § 966.
38. Pardo v. Evans-Lakeland, 38 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1949).
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he has received consideration for the agreement to keep it open. Where, there-
fore, the insurer agrees "during the life of this policy" to assume certain risks.
the language is construed as relating separately to each annual contract, unless
an intent to provide otherwise clearly appears. The upper and lower courts
split on the interpretation of a provision in a fidelity bond, renewable annually.
that regardless of the number of years the bond should continue in force,
liability on account of any employee would be limited to $5,000. An employee
embezzled more than $5,000 in each of two annual periods before the loss
was discovered. In overruling the circuit court and holding that the language
was "crystal clear," the appellate court seems to have treated the contract as
bilateral, not unilateral, and to have overlooked the principles stated, although
the result may be correct.
39
TORTS. Negligence causing harm through allergic reaction. If injury
results from the application of a beautician's preparation because of an allergic
reaction peculiar to the victim, there may be no recovery in tort although the
beautician knew, or should have known, that the preparation would cause
injury in that way. The substance nust be of such nature that it could be
inherently harniful, and that fact must be known to the defendant. On this
point the court seemed to be in agreement in a recent case,40 although it was
divided on the question whether or not this essential allegation was properly
pleaded. It is suggested that the court has unduly extended a rule aplllicable
only in workmen's compensation cases, where occupational diseases are not
deemed to be conpensable injuries unless specifically included within the
terms of the statute. That is because occupational diseases are not "accidents,"
and are not included in calculating the risk insured under an act which is
applicable only to accidental injury. However, an employee might recover from
an employer who knew. or should have known, that such injury would occur
in a proceeding at law even after the effective date of the workmen's compen-
sation statute, subject of course to the defense of assumption of risk.
Gross negliyence. The definition of gross negligence in cases where a
guest is suing the driver of an automobile for injuries received, is largely a
problen of drawing a line between one type of 'negligence and another.
Drawing front a rule formerly approve(] with respect to contributory negli-
gence,4 1 it has been suggested that wild or negligent conduct is reduced to
simple negligence when a driver is placed in sudden peril by the wrongful act
of a third person.4 2 The trial court refused a request to charge, which is set
39. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Parkinson. 38 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1948).
40. Collins v. Selighman & Latz, 38 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1948). Lacquer was applied to
plaintiff's scalp, causing injury over a prolonged period. It was alleged that defendant
knew or should have known, that this would be the result of permitting lacquer to come in
contact with plaintiff's scalp; but not that the lacquer was dangerous to the human scalp
generally. The plaintiff elected to appeal rather than to amend, indicating that this latter
point could not have been proved.
41. Hainlin v. Budge. 56 Fla. 342, 47 So. 825 (1908).
42. Sea Crest Corp. v. Burley, 38 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1949).
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out in the opinion, but covered this aspect of the case, according to the Supreme
Court, in charges which are not set out. The precise functioning of the rule,
when transposed from the field of contributory negligence, is hard to state;
since it appears that the evidence of negligence, which it is the function of the
rule to excuse, requires the case to be submitted to the jury.
WILLS AND TRUSTS. Restraints on alienation. In this country, contrary
to the English view, a certain freedom is given testators and settlors to impose
restraints on the alienation of property by beneficiaries to whom they have
otherwise given an absolute interest. The decisions in this state, particularly
in the field of spendthrift trusts, seemed to favor the English rule ;4 but
our court has recently aligned itself with the other American courts. 4 4 Al-
though restraints are permissible, the law does not favor restraints, and in the
absence of a clear expression of intent, no restraint should be implied. This
was illustrated in a case decided during the quarter, 45 in which the court was
required to construe a limitation to remaindermen, not subject to any condi-
tions subsequent, to be held in trust until each should reach the age of 30. The
estates were vested within the Rule against Perpetuities, which does not limit
restraints on vested interests. The problem was to decide whether the shares
were all to continue in trust until the youngest child was 30, or whether the
several shares were to be distributed to each in turn as he or she reached the
age of 30. The case was decided correctly with reference to the rule against
restraints on alienation, and not solely by reference to Webster's dictionary.
Gift inter tvivos or bequest? A donor may retain considerable control over
property, including the power to revoke, without making a gift testamentary.
If he intends death to be a condition precedent to vesting title, the gift is
testamentary; but if he simply intends to postpone enjoyment and makes the
gift subject to a condition subsequent, it is a gift inter vivos, and will be valid
if title has been transfered in a manner prescribed by law. In a recent case, 4"
the following facts, gathered from the dissenting opinion, had no-influence on
the majority, who affirmed without opinion 'a finding of present gift: the
subject matter was a bond and mortgage which were assigned to the donor; the
assignment was not recorded; the mortgagee clause in insurance policies was
not changed; the mortgagor was permitted to continue to pay interest to the
mortgagee; the donee was advised of the transaction; and the papers were
kept in the donor's personal safety deposit box. The holding is consistent
with what is in our opinion the rule of law applicable to such situations when
the administrator sties to recover the property from the donee. Tax liability
is based on different considerations.
43. See Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Electric Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243 (1911)
REPIPEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA, 320 (2d ed., 1946).
44. Waterbury v. Munn, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (1947).
45. Sherley v. Johnson. 38 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1948). three justices dissenting.
46. Harvey v. Hubbard, 38 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1948).
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Tenancy by the ettireties. When a husband and wife take title to land
in Florida as tenants by the entireties, the land forns 11o part of the husband's
estate if lie predeceases his wife. The federal estate tax liability is based on
an event other than transfer of title. Therefore when the widow agrees with
stepchildren to a division of the husband's estate after his death, property
which she owns as surviving tenant by the entireties is not included in the
agreement unless a clear intent to (to so appears nor is such property to be
considered as an advancement or satisfaction of the widow's share under a
will. If the widow takes her full interest in the remaining assets, she is under
no duty to share this property with other distrilbutees.'7
Purchase moiey resuting trufsts. Whether or not a trust results when
title to property purchased with the funds of one persoi is placed in the name
of another, is a question of intent. It is presumed that a trust results unless it
can be shown that a gift was intended. but when title is placed in the name of
a child, the father paying the price, or in the nane of a wife, the husband pay-
ing, there is a rebuttable presumlption that a gift was intended. The intent
which is material is that which existed when title was acquired: a subsequent
change of heart by a donor cannot divest a gift already made. Following this
rule, the lower court in a case currently reviewed 4, held that where a husband
bought property ini name of his wife and on subsequent resale the wife sur-
rendered the proceeds to the husband, this could not be shown to rebut the
presumption of a gift. This was doubtless correct: but it did not preclude the
use of the same evidence to show that at the later (late. the wife returned the
gift and thus divested herself of the property.
Extingishment of equitable iterest by transfer. Where property subject
to an equitable estate or lien is conveyed to a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice, the equitable interest is divested. The purchaser must satisfy
both requirements, notice and value, for if he takes with notice, value is no
defense. and an innocent donee is not entitled to protection. Legal interests in
property are not similarly divested unless a statute requiring liens and con-
veyances -to be recorded is held to have that effect, or unless the particular type
of property is endowed by law with the quality of negotiability. Lven where
a legal lien is not divested by sale to a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice, it is possible for the purchaser to acquire an equitable defense to the
enforcement of the lien. It is sometimes difficult, as in a current case, 40 to
47. Fletcher v. Fletcher. 38 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1949). The widow, being entitled to
one-third of decedent's estate, agreed to a division of Puerto Rican properties under
which she received one-third thereof. It was contended that because of valuable property
accruing to her as surviving tenant by the entireties in Florida. she had received more
than her share in Puerto Rico, and must have intended to bring her Florida property into
the agreement. The widow, instead of demurring, pleaded that the agreement was obtained
by fraud.
48. Fuller v. Fuller, 38 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1948).
49. Blackburn v. Venice Inlet Co., 38 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1948).
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determine whether the court is proceeding upon the theory that an equitable
right has been divested, or that an equitable defense has arisen to the enforce-
ment of-a legal right, particularly where the court makes alternative decisions.
The assignee of a judgment proceeded against persons claiming under the
purchaser at a foreclosure sale held twelve years earlier. The plaintiff was an
assignee of two judgments, junior to the mortgage, which assignments had
not been recorded when foreclosure was begun. The foreclosing party notified
the judgment creditor but not the assignee. Later, the assignee discovered -'o
that the mortgage was given to defraud creditors, and brought this action to
set the foreclosure aside to an extent sufficient to satisfy the judgments. The
court intimated that an assignee of a judgment, whose assignment was not
recorded, need not be joined in foreclosure proceedings to divest his lien, but
did not decide the point.,' It held that while a judgment creditor might have
execution within twenty years,. he was barred by the fact that the purchaser
had notoriously occupied and improved the premises for twelve years.
Acquisition of an equitable defense might well be denied a person having actual
notice of the legal right; hut the court held that a purchaser at foreclosure
sale is not as such charged with notice of matters not appearing on the record,
nor is the knowledge of an attorney or a real estate broker imputed to the client.
ADJECTIVAL LAW
EVIDENCE. Evidence of other crimes. Evidence in a criminal prosecution
showing that the accused has committed other crimes is ordinarily not admis-
sible to prove the commission of a particular crime; but this rule is subject to
exceptions where motive, identity of the accused, or a course of conduct are
material.' 2 Current cases illustrate the rule and its exceptions. In the case " of
a negro convicted of the murder of a white woman, where the accused admitted
the killing but claimed it was accidental, it was not error to adnit evidence that
he had recently heen convicted of writing letters to a white woman. It was also
proper to show that he had borrowed his employer's truck on the (lay of the
killing, giving a false reason therefor. Under a similar exception to the
gerniane rule excluding evidence of conduct with other parties at other ties
or places (res inter alios aria), it was proper to show that on the day of the
shooting the accused called at other houses in the vicinity, but left without
apparently accomplishing the purpose of his call when he found children about.
50. The assignee brought a creditor's bill previously and succeeded in setting aside
other conveyances between mortgagor and mortgagee; but the purchaser at foreclosure was
not a party. Wimmers v. Blackburn, 151 Fla. 236,9 So.2d 505 (1942).
51. The applicable statute does not specifically require an assignment to be recorded in
order to protect purchasers who rely on the record. F. S. 1941, § 28.01.
52. For further discussion of the rule and recent cases illustrating it, see Synopsis, 2
MlAmr L. Q. 339, and supra, pp 283, 294.
53. Quince v. State, 38 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1948).
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It was not proper, in a prosecution for homicide,5 4 to admit, over objections,
evidence tending to show that the accused unlawfully took certain property
from the business which he managed. While this would be reversible error,
under the recent holdings of thig court,r , the court did not notice the point,
apparently because the evidence would have justified conviction of a higher
degree of homicide.
Remote and prejudicial evidence. It is not error to admit in evidence a
photograph of the wounds inflicted upon the victim of a homicide, particularly
where the number and character of the wounds are relied upon as circumstantial
evidence to show that an admitted killing was felonious?6 Justice Chapman,
writing the opinion, voiced personal reservations, but in view of a prior
decision 57 felt that the law was so written. If the number and character of the
wounds were not material, we would agree with Justice Chapman that such
evidence is too remote and prejudicial solely to show the fact of death, if, as
would probably be the case, there is other evidence.
Circumstantial evidence. Where in a prosecution for homicide the killing
is admitted but the accused claims that it was accidental or in self-defense, it
is proper to admit evidence tending to disprove the claims made by the accused
as circumstantial evidence to show criminal intent. 8I Where the accused
claimed that he shot at a vicious dog and accidentally killed the victim, evi-
dence that there had been a struggle, by disproving the excuse, was competent
to prove criminal intent ;9 while in a case where self-defense is relied upon,
evidence that there was no struggle is admissible for the same purpose. 60 A
confession made after the crime, is admissible on the same basis,'" and evi-
dence of the extent of the wounds, showing that the accused went beyond the
limits of self-defense, is in the same category.6 2 When circumstantial evidence
is relied upon to obtain a conviction, the trial judge should, if requested, make
an appropriate charge; but he need not do so of his own motion.0 3 This is
recognition that circumstantial evidence is no less competent and probative
than any other type, the frequently expressed opinions of "guardhouse law-
yers" to the contrary notwithstanding.
The misconception that circumstantial evidence is less reliable than testi-
mony of witnesses is not confined to criminal cases. The contention that it may
54. Savage v. State, 38 So2d 47 (Fla. 1948). The court states this to be one of the
assignments of error on the appeal, but does not dispose of it.
55. Steese v. State, 36 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1948), discussed 2 MlAmI L, Q. 339; Fields v.
State, 37 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1948), noted supra, pp. 283, 294.
56. Savage v. State, 38 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1948).
57. See Chapman, J., in Mardorff v. State, 143 Fla. 64, 196 So. 625 (1940).
58. Berry v. State, 36 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1948), discussed, p. 44, supra.
59. Quince v. State, 38 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1948).
60. Griffis v. State, 38 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1948).
61. Supra.
62. Savage v. State, 38 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1948).
63. Grifs v. State, 38 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1948).
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not be admitted to prove negligence, was dismissed in a recent case.6 4 In the
picturesque language of Justice Terrell, the "eyewitness rule," which is pre-
sumably a rule excluding circumstantial evidence in negligence cases, has gone
the way of the blunderbuss and certain labot conditions in, 1840. Since these
events cover a wide period in history, it is difficult to determine whether in the
intervening period such a rule had actual acceptance in Florida, or whether
it is the offspring of an advocate's zeal. It may now safely be said that cir-
cumstantial evidence of any material fact is competent evidence, in this state as
etsewhere.
Res gestae. Statements made by the driver of an automobile involved in
an accident while awaiting the arrival of an ambulance for an injured pas-
senger are admissible as part of the res gestat to prove negligence."-
Privileged commuanications. In order to develop an effective method of acci-
dent prevention, it is provided by statute ' that statements made to police of-
ficers investigating causes of accidents are to be privileged. The admission of
such statements in evidence when corroborated by the officer's personal observa-
tions, and when merely cumulative with other evidence introduced, is not
reversible error."7 While this holding accords with the rule that a case will
be reversed only for harmful error, it is greatly to be feared that it will destroy
the effectiveness of the statute, and the system of accident reporting and
prevention which depends upon it.
Admissions by, interrogatory. It is provided by statute 05 that answers to
interrogatories shall be evidence against, but not for, the party making them.
In a recent case,'" it was contended that where answers to interrogatories are
filed, they must be considered by the chancellor; but the appellate court ruled
that the chancellor is not required to consider them unless they are offered in
evidence or called to his attention on final hearing. This section was not in-
tended to make evidence admissible which would otherwise be incompetent,
such as parole evidence to vary the terms of a written contract; but the
court based its answer on the procedural rather than the substantive reason.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. Even where an earlier law is not in conflict
with one of later date, the subsequent statute controls, according to a recent
case,7 0 which reduces the rule ad absurdumn in our opinion. In 1917, the
legislature enacted a general law determining the salaries of county judges in
64. Dehon v. Heidt, 38 So,2d 39 (Fla. 1948).
65. Sea Crest Corp. v. Burley, 38 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1949).
66. F. S. 1941, § 317.17.
67. Sea Crest Corp. v. Burley, 38 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1949).
68. F. S. 1941, § 63.48(7).
69. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 38 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1949). Answers by a widow showing that
she considered property owned in tenancy by the entireties to be included in a written
agreement to divide her husband's estate with stepchildren, were excluded because not
called to the chancellor's attention; but the agreement being unambiguous, the answers
should have been excluded under the parole evidence rule.
70. Ware v. Seminole County, 38 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1949). Action for a declaratory
judgment by the county judge to determine amount of his salary.
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all counties having a population of more than twenty-two thousand. When a
county court was established by special law in Seminole County in 1923,
there were fewer than twenty-two thousand persons therein. It was specifically
provided that all general laws not in conflict therewith would be deemed
applicable. In 1935, Seminole County had grown to contain more than
twenty-two thousand; but the court held that the special statute governed.
When the statutes were revised in 1941, effective the following July, the
-general statute was carried into the revision, and was held to supersede the
special law at that time.
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. Control of masters' and attorneys' fees. The
disposition on the part of the state supreme court to review, of its own motion,
fees paid to masters, 71 has been extended to cover fees of attorneys. In a
recent case, 72 in which it was contended that an award of alimony was exces-
sive, the court went beyond the scope of the appeal to find that the expenses of
litigation, including master's and attorneys' fees, were excessive. The power
of the courts to control such fees is found in the constitutional provision that
justice shall not be sold,73 and in recognition that attorneys as well as masters
perform judicial functions. It has been pointed out in another connection that
when a court of its own motion raises an issue not preferred by tile parties,
it may in the zeal of advocacy exceed impartiality in the use of its power.74 We
have been told, for example, that in one of the cases reported last Fall, it]
which the court reduced the master's fees on the basis that the case was
uncontested, the case was in fact bitterly contested and the attorneys for both
parties stipulated as to the master's compensation. When the case came before
the Supreme Court, the master was not notified or given an opportunity to
be heard, and the court somehow received the impression, from new counsel
wholly unfamiliar with the case, that it was uncontested. If attorney's and
master's fees are to be fixed, they should be fixed after a hearing, preferably
in the county where the litigation took place. The court has made it clear, by
a recent decision,75 that an uncontested case is not only one in which one
party defaults, but includes cases in which the contested matters are relatively
unimportant. Whether the blame lies upon this branch of the profession, we do
not know. 76
Functions of judge and jury. The principle that the jury, unless dis-
71. See Synopsis, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 336 (1948) ; and supra, p. 47. A comment on the
subject is being prepared to appear in this issue.
72. Garlick v. Garlick, 38 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1948).
73. FLA. CONST. (1885), Declaration of Rights, § 4.
74. See Synopsis, 2 MIAMi L. Q. 337 (1948), discussing Bernstein v. Bernstein, 36
So.2d 191 (Fla. 1948).
75. Rainey v. Rainey, 38 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1948). The only point litigated was a sum of
$3,000 given to the wife, which the husband contended should be returned.
76. "Every law course ought to be fortified with sufficient lessons in noblesse oblige
to point the spiritual responsibility that membership in the bar imposes." Terrell, J.. in
Rainey v. Rainey, 38 So.2d 60, 61 (Fla. 1948).
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pensed with in the manner provided by law, is the sole judge of the facts, was
illustrated strikingly in a current case. 77 A jury had failed to agree in a case
which was before the court on second trial. The second jury failed to agree
and the judge was unable, because of a statutory provision,78 to require it to
continue deliberating. He therefore directed a verdict for defendant, holding
that two failures to agree were equivalent to a finding that the plaintiff had
not sustained the burden of proof. The appellate court found otherwise,
holding that the trial judge could not, without invading fields reserved to the
jury, direct a verdict unless the evidence was legally insufficient to go to the
jury. It was unnecessary to discuss the "mere scintilla" rule, because the
plaintiff's evidence permitted a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt.
Grounds for order granting new trial. As has been previously noted, a
trial judge may not direct a new trial simply because he does not agree with
the jury as to the probative force of the evidence.79 A new trial may be
granted, however, for the reason that a single juror was incompetent mentally
to hear and to weigh the evidence; but there must he competent evidence in
the record to support a finding of mental deficiency: the trial judge, in other
words, cannot direct a new trial because he so violently disagrees with the
jury that, in his opinion, one or all of them are crazy.8 0
PROCnURE. Special appearance or plea in abatement. Where the jurisdic-
tion of a court is not challenged but an immunity from suit is asserted, this is
properly brought before the court by special appearance and motion to quash., 1
It has been held that this procedure, which is usually asserted by a nonresident
defendant claiming that lie has not been brought before the court by service,
is appropriately followed in connection with claim of privilege to remove to
the federal courtst82 This would seem to be an exact parallel, because neither
the jurisdiction of the court nor the effectiveness of its process is being
challenged in either case, but a privilege or immunity is being asserted. The
Supreme Court treated the case as presenting two alternatives, either to
dispose of the case as a matter of law on the motion to quash, or to try the
issue as a question of law and fact on a plea in abatement.83
Demurrer or motion to strike. Several pages of the reporter were occupied
77. Delion v. Heidt, 38 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1948).
78. F. S. 1941, § 54.22. provides that if a jury has failed to agree, it may be instructed
anew and sent back to deliberate further; but if it again fails, it may not be sent back
unless the jurors consent.
79. See Urga v. State. 36 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1948), noted s.rpra, p. 48.
80. Miami Beach v. Silver, 38 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1949). When, however, the Supreme
Court says, "it is difficult to disregard the opinion of Dr .... ," the impression that the
appellate court is reversing because it does not agree with the trial judge as to the
probative force of the evidence, which it is the trial judge's function to evaluate, is
unavoidable.
81. Harrell v. Black, 38 So.2d .310 (Fla. 1949). A sheriff of the state of South
Carolina was served with process while in Florida to return a fugitive. Immunity from
suit was admitted.
82. Rorick v. Chancey, 142 Fla. 290, 195 So. 418 (1940).
83. See State v. Civil Court, 137 Fla. 167, 188 So. 96 (1939).
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with a review of an order sustaining a demurrer, in which the court ruled that
a declaration which is argumentative, prolix., and contains statements of evi-
dence, is not deiurrable if it states a cause of action', On the substantive
point, there seemed to be little question. The proper procedure in such cases is
to move to strike or to nove for a compulsory amendnient. Certainly this is
a rule of the law of pleading well established in this state, and no case turning
on a matter so thoroughly settled should be permitted to occupy the time of the
Suprenie Court. The need of an effective screening process, such as a review
at the trial level 1)) a court en bODac of questions of law, is apparent.
Answer or cross bill. Equitable defenses are properly raised in an answer,
not by cross bill, according to a recent case.8-- The test forniulated is whether or
not the matters of defense relate and go to the equities of the subject matter
of llaintiff's bill. The application of the rule presents more difficulties than
the rule itself.
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84. Pardo v. Evans-Lakeland, 38 So.2d 307 (Fla, 1949). Action to recover surplus
realized on sale of repossessed property under the specific terms of a conditional sales
contract.
85. Swarz v. Goolsby, 38 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1949). Plaintiff, claiming under a tax deed,
sought to quiet title against the former owner and persons claiming under him. Asserting
that payment of the taxes had been tendered seasonably, but had been refused by the
Clerk of Court, the defendant offered to do equity. On motion to dismiss cross bill, order
of dismissal affirmed.
